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This paper examines the relationship between nancial liberalisation
and stock market volatility in Indonesia. By looking at the time series
properties of the Jakarta Composite Index (JCI) we identify breaks in
stock market volatility which coincide with the timing of major policy
events. Our main ndings are (i) a signicant decrease in volatility
after the "o¢ cial" opening of the stock market to foreign participation;
(ii) a signicant increase in volatility in the year before market opening
following reforms that eased entry requirements and the issuance of
brokerage licenses; and (iii) a signicant increase in volatility at the
time of the Asian crisis followed by a signicant decrease in the second
and sixth years after the crisis.
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1 Introduction
One of the controversial issues in the economic-development literature con-
cerns the merits of stock market liberalisation on emerging market economies.
Several empirical studies have shown that liberalisation has had positive e¤ect
on these economies via the decreased cost of equity, incresed returns, and in-
creased private physical investment (see Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Bekaert et
al., 2005). However, liberalisation may also expose the economy to specula-
tion and economic or political turmoil abroad making domestic markets more
volatile (see Singh, 1997; Arestis and Demetriades, 1999).
The e¤ect of nancial liberalisation on stock market volatility is a key
issue that policymakers in emerging market economies must face before they
decide whether or not to proceed with such a reform. This is because excessive
volatility, which may reect independence of stock-market-asset values from
underlying fundamentals (Shiller 1981 and 1989) has adverse implications for
the e¤ective allocation of resources and, thus, for investment (see Bekaert and
Harvey, 1997; Singh, 1997).1
Why should nancial liberalisation a¤ect stock market volatility? On the
one hand, liberalisation may reduce stock market volatility if it attracts a new
set of traders from already developed markets having previously been denied
access, whose decisions and strategies are based more on rational invetsment
analysis and fundamental valuation factors (Tauchen and Pitts, 1983). On
the other hand, liberalisation may also attract speculators and investors with
short-term horizons and expose the country to uncertainties abroad, resulting
in increased stock market volatility, asset price bubbles and nancial instabil-
ity (see Allen and Gale, 2000; Arestis and Demetriades, 1999; Singh, 2003).
Another possibility is that competing e¤ects may o¤set each other with liber-
1For instance excess volatility makes investors more averse to holding stocks due to
uncertainty, which leads to a higher risk premium and upwards pressures on interest rates,
hampering both the volume and the productivity of investment and, therefore, reducing
growth (Federer, 1993; DeLong et al. 1989). Excessive volatility may also increase the value
of the "option to wait" thereby delaying investment (Bekaert and Harvey, 1997).
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alisation not having much of an impact on volatility. Empirical evidence on
the subject is mixed, depending on the countries and periods that are studied
(for a survey, see Jayasurya, 2005).
In this paper, the issue of liberalisation and stock market volatility is exam-
ined in relation to Indonesia. The Indonesian experience is particularly relevant
for two reasons. Firstly, Indonesia was widely regarded well into the year of
the Asian crisis as the textbook example of the merits and benets of having
an active liberalised stock market (Hadiz and Robinson, 2005).2 Secondly, the
economys heavy reliance on the stock market for its investment funds also
made the country extremely vulnerable to international capital ight. With
an estimated contraction of 15% in output in 1998, Indonesia su¤ered one of
the most dramatic economic collapses recorded since the US Great Depression
of the 1930s and emerged as the most serious casualty of the Asian crisis.3
While there are some individual country studies of stock market volatil-
ity for Asia-Pacic countries such as Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan,
Thailand and India (see Jayasurya, 2005; Huang and Yang, 2000; Levine and
Zervos, 1998; Kwan and Reyes, 1997; De Santis and Imrohoroglu, 1997), it
is somehow surprising that no study to date has focused on Indonesia.4 This
paper lls the gap. Instead of identifying a priori a liberalisation date and
measure stock market volatility for some years before and after this date, we
employ the Nominating-Awardingmethodology of Karoglou (2007), which is
2Hadiz and Robinson (2005) note that "there are few developing economies where the
inuence of market-oriented technocrats and international agencies such as the World Bank
has been so embedded in the policy process as in Indonesia and where relationships between
the government and western economists have been so close."
3A World Bank study grimly observed that "Indonesia is in deep crisis. A country
that achieved decades of rapid growth, stability, and poverty reduction is now near economic
collapse. . . no country in recent history, let alone the size of Indonesia, has ever su¤ered
such a dramatic reversal of fortune" (World Bank, 1998).
4Kim and Singal (2000) examined changes in the level and volatility of stock returns,
ination and exchange rates around market openings for 18 emerging economies including
Indonesia. However, they excluded Indonesia from their analysis of stock return volatility
around market openings due to insu¢ cient data. Chang et al. (1995) analyze the intraday
price volatility of Indonesian stocks (i.e. they examine the rst-order serial dependence
between overnight returns and following daytime returns and between overnight returns and
preceding daytime returns).
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data-driven and identies non-parametrically both the number and timing of
volatility breaks in the returns of the benchmark stock market index. Our main
ndings are (i) a signicant decrease in volatility after the "o¢ cial" opening of
the stock market to foreign participation; (ii) a signicant increase in volatility
in the year before market opening following reforms that eased entry require-
ments and the issuance of brokerage licenses; and (iii) a signicant increase in
volatility at the time of the Asian crisis followed by a signicant decrease in
the second and sixth years after the crisis.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we
present an overview of the Indonesian stock market liberalisation. Section
3 outlines the statistical procedure for obtaining robust estimates of stock
market volatility when multiple breaks may be present. Section 4 discusses
the empirical results. Section 5 contains a summary and conclusion.
2 Indonesias Stock Market Liberalisation
When Indonesia launched a ve-year development plan in 1969, it was one of
the poorest countries in the world. Its per capita income was only US$50, about
half that of India, Bangladesh and Nigeria. However, within three decades, the
economy grew at historically unprecedented rates, almost 7% per year. In per
capita terms average Indonesian GDP growth over this period was 5% per year.
In 1997, Indonesias per capita GDP was over four times the 1969 level. In a
World Bank report (World Bank, 1993) the economies of Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand were compared with Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
South Korea, and the term East Asian Miracle was coined. Indonesias
nancial system grew commensurably with its economy turning into one of
the most developed systems among developing economies.
Liberalisation of the nancial sector has proceeded gradually. Interest rates
were liberalised in 1983. Foreign banks were allowed to set up joint ventures
with domestic banks in October 1988, but not permitted to have more than
4
six o¢ ces each in only six major cities (McLeod, 1999). Controls on banks
"o¤shore" borrowing were removed in March 1989. In February 1992, foreign
investors were allowed to acquire shares in domestic banks listed on the stock
market, albeit with some restrictions: they were not permitted to own more
that 49% of the banks total shares, and the government was required to have
majority shareholding in any state bank whose shares were o¤ered to the public
(McLeod, 1992).
Liberalisation of the stock market was planned by the Ministry of Finance
(MOF) to proceed in three phases.5 In December 1987, the MOF issued the
rst reform package (Pakdes I). The package freed the market from direct price
controls by eliminating limitations on daily price movements on the stock ex-
change. Foreign investors were allowed in, though under tight restrictions. One
notable restriction was that they could only purchase shares up to the amount
allowed by the provisions of the Investment Coordination Board (Badan Ko-
ordinasi Penanaman Modal, or BKPM) on foreign capital participation (Cole
and Slade, 1996). That constituted Phase I of the liberalisation.
Phase II comprises the introduction of a second reform package (Pakdes
II) in December 1988 easing listing requirements. More brokerage licenses
were issued and partial listing of large well-established companies was also
authorised. MOF decree 1055 issued on September 14, 1989 allowed foreigners
to purchase up to 49% of the shares in a new issue and hold up to 49% of
outstanding listed shares excluding bank shares. The International Finance
Corporation (1996,p. 53) considers the market open from September 16, 1989.
At end-1989, there were 67 rms listed compared with about 268 in 1996.
Capitalisation improved from Rupiah 449 billion in 1988 to Rupiah 215 trillion
5The stock market in Indonesia is made of three Stock Exchanges: the Jakarta Stock
Exchange, originally opened in 1912 under the Dutch colonial government and re-opened
in 1977, as well as two smaller ones, the Surabaya Stock Exchange (SSX) established in
1989, and an over-the-counter market known as Bursa Paralel (created in 1988 and merged
with the SSX in 1994). The SSX (and Bursa Paralel) is facilitating three markets: stock
trading for small and medium scale companies, bond trading/reporting for corporate and
government bonds, and derivatives trading for stock index futures.
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in 1996! This brought in foreign capital inow. Volume improved, prices surged
and more compnaies sought listing on the market.
A third package (Pakdes III) was introduced in December 1990 constituting
the nal phase of the liberalisation. The package provided for the privatisa-
tion of the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) when the government ceased control
of it, vesting it as a private limited company self-regulated by member com-
panies. Privatisation took place on July 13, 1992. The trading system was
automated in line with the regional practice of neighbouring countries. The
JSX signicantly improved its attraction as Indonesias major market. After
privatisation, traded value increased from about Rupiah 25 billion to about
Rupiah 69 billion. Prior to the Asian crisis, the market was capitalised at 45%
of GDP compared with 3% in the 1970s.
3 Methodology
The most commonly employed method in studies examining the issue of lib-
eralisation and volatility in the stock market is to identify a single liberali-
sation date and measure volatility for some years before this date (the pre-
liberalisation period) and some years after this date (the post-liberalisation
period). The liberalisation date is usually the date when the policy was imple-
mented although some studies have used the announcement date of the policy
based on the notion that stock markets respond immediately to the arrival of
new information. Demetriades et al. (2007) argue that such an approach may
lead to misleading volatility estimates either because the liberalisation date is
not properly identied (market participants could easily adjust their trading
strategies well before or after the announcement dates or the implementation
dates depending, for example, on information leakages and changes in the de-
gree of credibility of the policy makers) or because there are other irrelevant
or non-directly relevant breaks in the pre/post-liberalisation period. Conse-
quently, they argue that this literature needs to be revisited using data-driven
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techniques and made robust to the existence of multiple breaks.
The remainder of this section outlines the method to obtain volatility esti-
mates that are robust in the presence of breaks without resorting to estimating
Regime Switching models. Drawing from the Nominating-Awarding method-
ology of Karoglou (2007) rst we identify the number and timing of exist-
ing breaks and then we estimate volatility in each dened segment or period.
Specically, Section 3.1 describes the procedure that nominatesbreakdates
and Section 3.2 describes the procedure that awardsthe breakdate property
to some of the nominations. Section 3.3 refers to the volatility measures that
we employ.
3.1 Breakdate Nominations
The techniques that are employed to detect the number and identify the timing
of structural breaks draw on the literature that aims at detecting a single break
in the volatility dynamics. Specically, we use the Inclan and Tiao (1994) test
(I&T) and the second test of Sanso et al. (2003), joined with the Bartlett
kernel (SACBT ).
Karoglou (2006) shows that the relative performance of each of the above
tests depends on the underlying data generating process (DGP). For example,
the I&T is found to be the most sensitive to the existence of volatility breaks for
independent and identically distributed data but su¤ers severe size distortions
for strongly dependent data. In contrast, the SACBT does not exhibit size
distortions but its power is smaller. As a result, when the DGP is not known,
it is preferable to use them both and to select the breakdate according to an
appropriate rule, depending on the specic objective of the exercise. Here we
accept a breakdate nomination either when the SACBT detects it at 5% level
of signicance or when the I&T detects it at 1% level of signicance.
For the detection of multiple breaks it is necessary to incorporate these
tests in an iterative scheme (algorithm) and to apply them to sub-samples of
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the series, dened by the detected breakpoints. Inclan and Tiao (1994) propose
a version of such an algorithm, which they name Iterative Cumulative Sums
of Squares (ICSS). However, Karoglou (2007) shows that ICSS may not be
robust to the presence of transitional periods between volatility periods. Such
periods are likely to exist when the response of market participants to new
information is a gradual one, which may be particularly relevant in emerging
market economies. For this reason, this paper employs an algorithm that is
more robust to the existence of transitional periods introduced by Karoglou
(2007). When there are no transitional periods, Karoglous algorithm pro-
duces identical results as ICSS, assuming the underlying tests detect the true
breakdate. This algorithm involves the following six steps:
1. Calculate the test statistic under consideration.
2. If the statistic is above the critical value split the particular data segment
into two parts at the corresponding point.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for the rst segment until no more (earlier) change-
points are found.
4. Mark this point as an estimated change-point of the whole series.
5. Remove the observations that precede this point (i.e. those that consti-
tute the rst segment).
6. Consider the remaining observations as the new sample and repeat steps
1 to 5 until no more change-points are found.
The above algorithm is implemented with both of the (single breakdate
CUSUM type) test statistics described above, i.e. I&T and SACBT .
3.2 Breakdate Awards
After detecting the potential breakdates and corresponding volatility periods
using the Karoglou algorithm, we use a battery of robustness tests in order to
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conrm that neighboring regimes have di¤erent variances. These robustness
tests involve a di¤erent approach to the CUSUM-type tests in that they test
for the homogeneity of variances of distinct samples (in our case these samples
are two successive segments) without considering the time-series dimension
of the data. In this paper we use (1) the standard F-test; (2) the Siegel-
Tukey test with continuity correction (Siegel and Tukey, 1960, and Sheskin,
1997); (3) the adjusted Bartlett test (see Sokal and Rohlf, 1995, and Judge
et al., 1985); (4) the Levene (1960) test; and (5) the Brown-Forsythe (1974)
test. The F-test requires equal sample sizes and is sensitive to departures
from normality. The Siegel-Tukey test does not require neither equal samples
nor normality; however it assumes that the samples are independent and have
equal median. The Bartlett test is also robust when the sample sizes are not
equal, however it is still sensitive to departures from normality. Its adjusted
version considers a correction factor for the critical values and the arcsine-
square root transformation of the data in order to conform with the normality
assumption. The Levene test is an alternative to the Bartlett test albeit less
sensitive to departures from normality. Finally, the Brown-Forsythe test is a
modied Levene test (substituting the group mean by the group median) and
appears to be superior in terms of robustness (when scores are highly skewed
or samples are relatively small) and power.
3.3 Volatility Estimators
The magnitude and direction of the change in volatility is proxied by comparing
the unconditional variance of each segment with its neighboring segments. The
measures of unconditional variance that we use are: (i) the sample standard
deviation; (ii) a Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) es-
timator of the standard deviation - we use the VARHAC estimator of den Haan
(1997) that bypasses the problem of selecting an appropriate bandwidth; (iii)
the square root of the unconditional variance of the most elaborate GARCH
9
model that could t the data.6
4 Empirical Results
The data employed in this study are weekly stock returns on the Jakarta
Composite Index (JCI) calculated from weekly closing prices. The price data
series begins on April 11, 1983 and ends on January 23, 2006. Figure 1 plots
the JCI weekly stock returns over the sample period. Figure 2 shows the
corresponding volatility as modelled by the procedure described in the previous
section. Six volatility breaks, that is seven segments or periods are identied.
They are depicted on each gure using horizontal lines.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of the stock returns for each of the
segments identied. The magnitude and direction of the change in volatility
is proxied by comparing the unconditional variance of each segment with its
neighboring segments using the simple standard deviation and the VARHAC
estimator as discussed above. The distribution of return is positively skewed
in the rst ve segments and negatively skewed in the last two segments, and
is leptokurtic in each segment. The Jarque-Bera statistic indicates rejection
of the normal distribution hypothesis. These results are consistent with those
obtained by De Santis and Imrohoroglu (1997), who nd that in both devel-
oped and emerging markets the skewness and excess kurtosis statistics are not
equal to zero. Moreover, Bekaert and Harvey (2000) nd that skewness and
excess kurtosis in 20 emerging stock markets are signicantly di¤erent from
zero. Further test results indicate that the null of hypothesis of unconditional
normality can be rejected at the 5% level in 15 of the countries. Koutmos
(1999) also rejects normality using KolmogorovSmirnov statistics at the 5%
level for Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand, for
the period January 2, 1986December 1, 1995. Other recent papers, which
6The most elaborate GARCH model refers to the model that has the highest number of
statistically signicant lagged parameters.
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reject the null hypothesis for normal distribution, include Fraser and Power
(1997) for Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia and Australia for the pe-
riod January 1, 1988October 14, 1994. Fraser and Power (1997) nd that the
skewness statistic is signicantly di¤erent from zero for all sample countries
except Australia, while the excess kurtosis statistic is signicantly di¤erent
from zero for all the markets.
Table 2 reports the results of the robustness checks discussed above. These
results conrm that the neighboring regimes have statistically di¤erent vari-
ances. Table 3 reports the timing of the breaks and relevant policy events. The
rst segment exhibits a conditionally heteroskedastic behaviour with volatility
nevertheless at its lowest level for the whole sample.7 ;8 This is hardly suprising
since for the period between 1983 and 1987, the Indonesian stock market was
at its early stages of development with few quoted companies, small capitalisa-
tion, high concentration, low liquidity and a rudimentary institutional set-up.
Indeed, there was no clear need, nor incentive, for eligible government-owned
companies to raise capital through the capital market. Subsidised credit by
the central bank and easy availability of nance from abroad under the open
capital account seemed to meet the nancing needs of state enterprises and
larger private enterprises which would have qualied to list on a stock ex-
change. As Cole and Slade (1996, p.154) stated: "The modest o¢ cial goal of
10 new listings a year was not achieved in any of the years from 1977 to 1988."
The number of listed companies only increased from 23 to 24 between 1983-87.
At the end of 1987, the total value of equity public o¤erings listed at the JSE
7The corresponding conditionally heteroskedastic structure is given by
yt =
 0:178t
(0:053)
+ "t
where "t =
p
ht  ut; ut is iid N(0; 1), and
ht =
0:086
(0:009)
+ 0:452"2t 1
(0:123)
:
8Note that this is the only segment in which we have identied some very small deviations
from risk neutrality.
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was Rupiah 111 million, a mere Rupiah 1 million increase from 1983. Market
capitalisation was Rupiah 100 billion.
The following two segments are short and can be regarded as transitional
periods. Each of the two segments exhibits homoskedastic behaviour. In the
second segment volatility remains low. This segment starts with a break which
coincides with the release in February 1988 of a publication from Indonesias
Capital Market Supervisory Agency (Bapepam) clarifying the provisions of
Pakdes I (December 23, 1987) on foreign portfolio investment (see Bapepam,
1988, pp. 5-6). This is because Pakdes I itself only stated that foreign investors
could purchase shares up to an amount allowed by the e¤ective provisisons of
BKPM (the Investment Coordination Board) on foreign capital participation
without making explicit the eligible companies and the general limits.
The third segment sees volatility reaching its highest level for the whole
sample period. This segment starts with a break located two weeks before
Pakdes II (December 20, 1988). It coincides with a period of accelerated
growth in trading activities and volume of shares issued. In the two years
following Pakdes II, the number of listed companies rose from 25 to 67 in
1989, and from 67 to 132 in 1990. The total value of equity public o¤erings
listed at the JSE increased from Rupiah 131 million at the end of 1988 to
Rupiah 2 billion at the end of 1989, a remarkable 1500% increase! It reached
Rupiah 7.2 billion at the end of 1990, a 400% increase from 1989!
The fourth segment is the longest of the whole sample and exhibits a condi-
tionally heteroskedastic behaviour.9 In this segment volatility is low and stable.
The segment starts with a break which coincides with the MOF decree issued
9The corresponding conditionally heteroskedastic structure is given by
yt = "t
where "t =
p
ht  ut; ut is iid N(0; 1) and
ht =
1:222
(0:089)
+ 0:438"2t 1
(0:063)
:
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on September 14, 1989, which opens the stock market to foreign investor.10
Capitalisation continues to expand but the growth in trading activities and
volume of shares issued decelerates.
The fth segment coincides with the Asian crisis. This segment exhibits
homoskedastic behaviour. Unsurprisingly, there is a signicant increase in
volatility. The segment starts with a break located in the week during which
the decision to oat the Rupiah was taken (August 14, 1997). The resulting
sharp devaluation of the Rupiah against the US dollar signicantly a¤ected
the stock market as most issuers had un-hedged foreign exchange liabilities.
The sixth segment is short and exhibits homoskedastic behaviour. There
is a signicant decrease in volatility. The segment starts with the fth break
which is located one week after Indonesia held its rst free parliamentary elec-
tion since 1955, on the day (June 7, 2002) that the IMF approved a US$450
million loan package (IMF, 1999). The announcement sparked positive senti-
ment in the stock market. Share prices up went up to a 22-month high, with
the JCI gaining 76.8 points from the previous months level.
Finally, the seventh and last segment also exhibits homoskedastic behav-
iour. Volatility returns to the level observed in the period from the opening of
the market through to the start of the crisis. The segment starts with the last
break located in the second week of January 2003. This break coincides with
the Working Meeting of Indonesian Capital Market Industry held on January
17-18, 2003. The meeting yelded a strategic agreement between Bapepam as
the regulator and securities companies as the major player of the industry to
implement a new policy on securties rmscapitalisation and organisational
structure (Bapepam, 2003). This new policy was geared towards achieving tac-
tical goals such as strengthening capital structure, improving services quality,
10The decree came after Minister of Finance Sumarlins press conference on August 5,
1989. During the conference Mr Sumarlin reportedly said that 49% of all stocks could be
sold to foreign investors. A mini-boom occurred in the capital market on the basis of rumors
that the stock of the PMA (a join venture rm) would be eligible for purchase by foreigners
(Cole and Slade, 1996).
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and increasing compliance with existing existing rules and regulation.
5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this paper we employed data-driven techniques to identify both the number
and timing of breaks in the volatility of the Indonesian stock market. No-
ticeably, we found a number of breaks which coincide with signicant policy
events, most notably the "o¢ cial" opening of the market to foreign investors
in September 1989 and the decision to oat the Rupiah in August 1997.
Capital market reforms that eased entry requirements and the issuance of
brokerage licenses coincided with a dramatic increase in stock market volatility.
In contrast, volatility signicantly decreased when the market was opened
to foreign investors. Following market opening and until the Asian crisis,
stock market volatility remained low while the economy beneted from large
external capital inows.11 Remarkably, the signicant increase in volatility
which accompanied the crisis was of short duration. Volatility subsequently
decreased two years and six years after the crisis and returned to the same
level that had prevailed from the opening of the market.
The evidence herein adds more weight to the view that Indonesia bene-
ted from increased accessibility to foreign investors as a result of the capital
market reforms it implemented in the late 1980s. This, in turn, suggests that
integration with the world markets made the equilibrating process more e¢ -
cient for stocks in Indonesia. Proponents of capital controls should take note
of thet fact that liberalisation took place 8 years before the Asian crisis began.
It would seem unlikely that the act of market liberalisation was responsible for
the crisis.
Our results are consistent with those obtained in a number of empirical
11Ari¤ and Khalid (2005) pointed out that foreign direct investments increased from an
average of about US$250 million to US$600 million in the early years after market opening.
The total inow of foreign direct investments in the 1991-97 period amounts to a US$23
billion injection of capital representing an average of 15 percent of GDP. Next to China, this
is the largest ow of foreign investments. Porfolio investment also increased considerably.
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studies, which fail to show that foreign investorsparticipation in emerging
markets was characterised by market volatility. For example, Richards (1996)
and Kim and Singal (2000) nd no evidence that volatility has increased;
rather results indicate that it has fallen. In addition, Chan et al. (1998) nd
no evidence of rational speculative bubbles following the 1997 crisis in Asian
markets (Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Segment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mean -0.000285 0.006161 0.012906 0.000413 -0.00024 -0.001248 0.003013
Std. Dev. 0.003594 0.008721 0.075245 0.013591 0.03767 0.017364 0.013559
VARHAC 0.0086678 0.013393 0.033681 0.020976 0.029564 0.017397 0.01369
Skewness 0.22 1.17 3.65 0.50 0.31 -0.50 -0.33
Kurtosis 5.36 6.00 20.35 7.54 3.39 4.39 3.62
Jarque-Bera 61.38*** 24.23*** 575.78*** 372.24*** 2.11 22.96*** 5.35*
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.07
Observations 255 40 39 414 96 187 159
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level
respectively.
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Table 2: Robustness tests
Segments t-test F-test Siegel-Tukey Bartlett Levene Brown-Forsythe
1 and 2 8.21*** 5.89*** 5.15*** 77.02*** 32.93*** 30.66***
2 and 3 0.56 74.45*** 3.35*** 113.3*** 6.72** 4.89**
3 and 4 2.93*** 30.65*** 1.3 430.9*** 43.9*** 30.85***
4 and 5 0.28 7.68*** 8.6*** 217.37*** 152.63*** 139.94***
5 and 6 0.31 4.71*** 5.58*** 80.77*** 54.08*** 48.73***
6 and 7 2.51** 1.64*** 1.65* 10.19*** 4.83** 4.89**
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level
respectively.
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Table 3: Timing of breaks and policy events
Timing of breaks Policy events
February 1988 Bapepam publication (February 1988) claries the
(week 4) provisions of Pakdes I (December 23, 1987) on foreign
portfolio investment: foreign participation is authorised
under tight restrictions.
December 1988 Pakdes II (December 20, 1988) eases listing requirements;
(week 1) increase in the number of brokerage licenses issued;
partial listing is authorised for large well-established
companies.
September 1989 MOF decree 1055 (September 14, 1989) authorises up
(week 2) to 49% foreign ownership in shares of companies
listed on the JSX excluding bank shares.
August 1997 Rupiah is oated (August 14, 1997) as Thai Baht crisis
(week 2) spread; nancial crisis.
June 1999 IMF board approves a US$450 million rescue
(week 2) package for Indonesia (June 7, 1999); rst free
parliamentary elections since 1955 (June 7, 1999).
January 2003 Working meeting of Indonesian Capital Maket Industry
(week 2) (June 17-18, 2003) yields strategic agreement between
Bapepam and securities companies on securities
rmscapitalisation and organisational structure.
.
Sources: Bapepam reports, Bank Indonesia reports, Ari¤ and Khalid (2005),
Cole and Slade (1996).
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Figure 1: JSX stock returns
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Figure 2: Volatility dynamics of JSX stock returns
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